When during the Polish uprising the plans to mobilize the Military March in an insurrection against Turkey and war against Austria broke down, and after Austria smashed the network of secret agents and committees set up by Oreskovic, Serbia had very few contacts with the Krajina and the frontiersmen in the period between the end of 1864 and the spring of 1866. In August 1866, Oreskovic informed General Türr that, because of Italy's failure in 1864 to enter into an agreement with Serbia, adopt its war plan and aid the frontiersmen, he was forced to break off all his links in the Krajina or reduce them to essential contacts. Serbia had very poor relations with the Military Frontier in 1866, when the war broke out between Austria on the one side, and Italy and Prussia on the other. The government of Italy, with Prime Minister General La Marmora, did not want to undertake any revolutionary methods in its struggle for liberation and unification. For this reason, it avoided contacts with the Garibaldians, the Hungarian emigrés, and Serbia, which could have easily set the Frontier alight. But what the government of Italy failed to do was attempted by the Hungarian general Türr and the Italian consul Scovasso. They both believed that war against Austria should be conducted in conjunction with guerrilla actions in the Danube basin, which implied the insurrection of the Military Frontier and the landing of volunteers in Dalmatia. Anxious to do something, Türr requested Oreskovic in April 1866 to inform him whether it was possible to renew the earlier planned action among the frontiersmen. Impressed by the mobilization which Austria began on April 27, when it also started moving units from the Military Frontier toward the Italian borders, the secretary general of the Italian ministry of foreign affairs, Marcello Cerruti, asked Consul Scovasso to find out whether the Serbian government could in some way prevent the transfer of frontiersmen in the direction of Italy. Although convinced that Italy was late with this request, because some of the frontier units were already close to its territories, Scovasso hoped that Garasanin would be able to do something. Garasanin promised to do his best, but because of Italy's unexplained and one-sided break in cooperation with Serbia, contacts in the Military Frontiers had been severed, and it was difficult to renew them in a hurry. Scovasso started working out a plan with Oreskovic to synchronize the uprising in the Military Frontier with the landing in Dalmatia. However, the Italian consul's activity in Belgrade was stopped when his superiors in Turin asked him "to inform Prince Mihailo and Garasanin that the Italian government absolutely does not wish anything to be undertaken against the Turkish areas," but that otherwise it was ready "to do everything possible to prevent the remaining troops in the Military Frontier from joining the Austrian army." This was a clear sign that Italy, like Kvaternik in 1866, did not want the Eastern Question opened. Garasanin on his part thought that the only way to stop the remaining frontiersmen from going to war against Italy was to direct them to Bosnia. He did see the possibility of the Military Frontier's participation in a war against Austria in the event of an uprising, but only if a revolution was staged in Hungary. Since no agreement was achieved, the Serbian government decided to stay aloof during the Italo-Prussian war against Austria. When Consul Scovasso realized that Serbia was not going to take part in a war in which the Italians and Hungarian emigrés demanded only sacrifices from her but offered no benefits, he noted in one of his reports: "Serbia will remain peaceful... and Turkey will guard the Austrian Military Frontier."⁶²

Why Serbia in 1866 did not get involved in the war is due to the fact that Belgrade doubted that France would take up arms in a war against Austria, and it had more esteem for the power of its northern neighbour than for the military might of Prussia and Italy. Moreover, Serbia stood on the sidelines because Russia told her to stay put,⁶³ but also because militarily she was not yet ready for war.

Very active among the frontiersmen on the Croatian side was Imbro Ignjatijevic Tkalac. As a political emigré he was then an official in the Italian ministry of foreign affairs. He maintained a close rapport with the leader of Hungarian emigrés, Lajos Kossuth. By arrangement with him and Cerruti, Tkalac went to Paris in mid-May 1866, where he was expected to write proclamations and political tracts to dissuade the frontiersmen from fighting against Italy and Prussia, to help start a revolution in the Military Frontier and Croatia, to help overthrow the Habsburgs and promote understanding between the Croats and Hungarians. Emperor Napoleon did not go along with this undertaking, because he did not expect much from either the Hungarians or the Slavs from Austria.⁶⁴ But Prince Gérome Napoleon supported Tkalac's anti-Austrian policy in the Military Frontier and Croatia. When Tkalac informed him of having written the pamphlet, The Austrian Question: Who Is to Resolve It, How, and When? A Letter to Brother Croats and Serbs, the prince encouraged him to continue his work and told him: "Work, act, create."⁶⁵ In the estimation of Tkalac, expressed in a letter to Kossuth, this "pamphlet, written in the Croatian or, if you prefer, the Serbian language - with the energy of my style, forcefulness, logic, and clarity, simply calls upon Croatia to liberate itself from Austria, to recall the army from the frontier to jointly fight with Hungary, to suspend the negotiations in Budapest which are poisoned with Austrian intrigues,⁶⁶ to fight until the establishment of freedom in the common country."⁶⁷ Tkalac and his pamphlet described the Military Frontier as a studfarm, in which "children are sired only for the Emperor's army." He called for Austria's destruction and pointed out that for both the Croats and Serbs "revolution is the only salvation." Addressing himself to the frontiersmen, Tkalac wrote: "I am talking to you, the Serbian and Croatian soldier, to you, poor wretch, who have been told since your childhood that you have no other duty in the world than to obey the Emperor and imperial commanders, I am talking to you, whose nationality, freedom, and every human right have been taken away! The Serbs and the Croats have no business in this war."

A genuine and sincere Yugoslav, possibly the greatest and the most devoted Yugoslav of the 19th century not only among the Croats but also among the Serbs, Tkalac in all his public utterances always took into account both Croatian and Serbian national interests. He was free from any national selfishness and bigotry, which were a feature of many of his contemporaries, both on the Croatian and on the Serbian side. He made no distinction whatever between the national, political, and state interests of the Serbs and Croats. He raised his voice against Serbian as well as Croatian hegemony, and demanded of both the Serbs and Croats that they "join together on the basis of equal and identical rights and duties and put themselves at the head of all other (South Slav) peoples and fight against the common enemy until a common freedom for all has been achieved."

Tkalac's pamphlet The Austrian Question was dedicated not only to the Croatian and Serbian frontiersmen but also, according to its author, "to all those who can read and want to learn about the possibility, need, chances and consequences of the revolution." The pocket-size pamphlet contained about as many words as a Paris newspaper. It was planned to be printed in 10,000 copies, of which 2,000 were to be distributed to the frontiersmen at the fronts in Bohemia and Venice, 2,000 to the Serbian population in southern Hungary, 1,500 in Croatia, 500 in Dalmatia, and 2,000 in the Croatian and Hungarian parts of the Military Frontier.⁶⁸ Because of limited funds, the pamphlet was printed in far smaller numbers than was planned, and many of its copies intended for Southern Slav areas under Austria did not reach their readers. The ship transporting these copies across the Adriatic sank,⁶⁹ and Tkalac's pamphlet did not play the role which was intended for it. Only those copies arrived in Croatia, southern Hungary and Bohemia which Tkalac personally sent to individual addressees, via Constantinople and Belgrade.⁷⁰

In the second half of June, 1866, Tkalac wrote a proclamation to the frontiersmen. In its introductory part he reminded the Serbian and Croatian soldiers of Francis Joseph's war manifesto, in which he called upon them to defend the rights of the Emperor and German princes, his allies, against Prussia and Italy. He explained that this right was nothing more than Austria's desire to prevent the creation of a large German national state, to prevent liberal reforms among the German people, and to make use of the frontiersmen, other Slavs, and Hungarians. Tkalac warned the frontiersmen that internecine German squabbles did not concern them at all; the danger was in the fact that with the strength of their arms they could help Austria overcome Prussia, and that the Monarchy, thus strengthened, would stifle the nationality and freedom of all its non-German peoples.

As regards the imperial right over Italy, Tkalac identified it as Austria's intention to maintain by brute force its authority in Venice, although the latter wanted to be united with Italy, in which it was backed by the entire Italian nation. Invoking his imperial right, Tkalac explained to the frontiersmen, the emperor "ordered you to leave your homeland and your homes, your wives and your children, and to shed your blood for a cause which concerns you not in the least and in relation to which, every one of your personal, political and national interests is completely contrary to the Emperor's interest. Until such time as Prussia creates a unified state of Germany under its sceptre and Austria is forced to withdraw from Germany, your blood will always be shed for the ambitions of the Habsburg dynasty, and your nationhood will be suffocated by the Austrian Germans, who regard themselves as your masters, because Austria wants to proclaim itself as the only German power. For as long as Venice and the Italian Tyrol remain under the Austrian yoke, and until the unification of Italy is completed so that the Austrian emperor is forced to abandon any hope of reconquering Lombardy, Tuscany, and Modena, you will never enjoy peace and rest in your homes, and you will always be forced to fight for his ambitions. In other words, your interest is that Germany and Italy be constituted as military states, without Austria intervening in their national and political affairs: this is exactly contrary to what the Emperor wants you to fight for in the field."

The proclamation went on to say: "What possible reason can you have to fight the Italians and Prussians, who have no quarrel with you, just as you have none with them, and who are only the Emperor's enemies, but not yours as well. Your enemy, the only enemy you have, is Austria, and you must fight the Austrian emperor to shake off the yoke which is as undignified as it is intolerable. It is not for you to fight against Prussia and Italy, and you can only stay on the sidelines as disinterested observers. Let the Austrian Emperor and his faithful allies, the German princes, fight for his ambition and his interests: it is their cause and not at all yours. Your life, your blood, your strength belong to your own homeland, to your people and not to the Austrian Emperor or to German princes, and God behooves you to commit them only for the defence of your country and your freedom. Austria has forced you to take part in the crimes which it is continuing to commit against what is most sacred to all peoples: against their nationality and their freedom. Austria's policy has besmirched the erstwhile respected and glorious name of Croats and Serbs and made it to be the most detestable curse among all European peoples." Tkalac then called upon the frontiersmen to disobey their officers en masse, thereby showing loyalty to their motherland and to their nation. He assured them that their "noble example" would soon be followed by the Hungarians and by other Slavs. He asked them to surrender under a white flag to the Italians and Prussians, and told them that they were not expected to turn their weapons against the army which they had deserted. However, Tkalac emphasized, after surrendering to the Italians or Prussians, the frontiersmen must maintain discipline and order. He instructed them to select from among their officers' ranks the most competent and reliable men as commanders, who would immediately send them back home and place them at their country's disposal. Tkalac's plan was to send all the frontiersmen who had surrendered to the Italians or Prussians into a war against Turkey for the liberation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. He ended the proclamation with the following words: "The hour of your freedom will strike before you expect it and our motherland will need your forces and your gallantry to regain its freedom and to free your unhappy brothers in Bosnia and Hercegovina from the Turkish yoke under which they are groaning. You wretched soldier of the Frontier, who since your childhood have been told that you have no country and no duty other than a slavish obedience to the Emperor; you, whom the Austrian policy has deprived of his motherland, nationality, freedom, and every human right, making you blind to its sinister plans, here is your true goal: take advantage of the military training which the Austrian policy has given you, hoping to make you their weapon against the freedom of all peoples; make use of it in order to prove your valour in a just and legitimate war, in the imminent war for the freedom of our motherland, and the happy generations to come will bless your memory!"

The proclamation was printed in octavo. The plan was to publish it in 10,000 copies, one half to be sent to the Prusso-Austrian, and the other half to the Italo-Austrian front.⁷² However, because of difficulties in distribution and insufficient funds, only 5,000 copies were printed. Since the typesetters in Paris did not know a word of a Slav language, the printing of the proclamation and the pamphlet took a very long time, for Tkalac, by nature very meticulous, did not want to permit his text to contain any printing errors. Furthermore, there were some misunderstandings between him and Kossuth about the contents of the pamphlet.⁷³ All this slowed down the job so that the pamphlet and the proclamation appeared with a delay, after the war was already finished.⁷⁴ Tkalac claimed that his efforts to raise the frontiersmen and foment the revolution failed because they were "overtaken by the lightning victories of the Prussian army." Tkalac also found reason for his failure in the "stupidities of the Italian and Hungarian politicians, who acted contrary to their duty." He believed that the war of 1866 was a great opportunity lost. He doubted that another would soon present itself, but comforted himself with the hope that everything could be resolved with the Eastern Question. If the Eastern Question is properly dealt with, Tkalac wrote, "it may give us an opportunity to get back to our actions. As long as this chance remains, I shall not lose hope; but if we do not take advantage of it, we might as well bury ourselves alive. I shall do whatever I can, if only to still my conscience."⁷⁵

Although the Military Frontier after 1866 was frequently the object of national political and liberatory plans of the Serbs and Croats, Tkalac no longer took interest in them. Once he lost the status of political emigré and became a naturalized Italian and a civil servant, he could not involve himself in political schemes such as those of 1866, not even to still his conscience. However, his 1866 action deserves special attention because he was the first among the Croats and Serbs to attempt to use the might of the Military Frontier for their common rather than separate national interests. In this respect, he was ahead even of the Serbian government led by Garasanin and the National Party under Strossmayer, who understood only after the war's end that their national political plans and goals must be coordinated, failing which there would be no success.

Biblioteka | Agreement and Cooperation

Copyright © 1997 by Vasilije Krestic
Copyright © 1997 by BIGZ , Beograd
Copyright © 1998 by Serbian Unity Congress