Although Serbia after Prince Mihailo's assassination ceased to conduct an active policy and under the regency government temporarily came closer to Austria-Hungary, the Military Frontier remained an important factor in its policy. This was very well understood by Consul Kállay, who warned his superiors in Vienna and Budapest that Serbia's military potential, notwithstanding certain shortcomings, notably an insufficient number of trained officers, had to be respected. In the event of a war into which Austria might be drawn, Kállay wrote, the Serbs could be extremely dangerous because they enjoyed sympathies in the Croatian and Hungarian sections of the Military Frontier, from where they would be likely to receive aid. Because of this danger from Serbia, Kállay was instructed while in Belgrade to work on strengthening Serbia's confidence in the Monarchy.⁹⁰

In a conversation with Count Andrássy, Oreskovic stated openly that in the event of a liberation movement in the Balkans, which Austria-Hungary would oppose, the Serbs and Croats could easily call upon all Southern Slavs and frontiersmen to mutiny, and thereby relieve themselves of the threats and pressures from the North. Aware of this fact, Kállay also distrusted the Croatian National Party. He assumed that it could call the Croatian masses to a rebellion and set the frontiersmen up in arms. Furthermore, he was also afraid of the military circles in Vienna, who were against the demilitarization of the Frontier and looked for ways to prevent its disestablishment. Having considered all these circumstances, he came to the conclusion that "the Military Frontier should cease to exist as soon as possible," because, as he wrote to Andrássy, "until this happens, there will be neither peace nor security; this armed mass can also be a means in the hands of reactionaries, as well as, in certain circumstances, an instrument in the hands of a hostile Serbian movement."⁹²

After Prince Mihailo's assassination, when action by the Croats and Serbs in the Frontier was dying down, and the debate on its demilitarization was already in full swing, military circles felt the time was ripe to use the frontiersmen to conquer Bosnia and Hercegovina.⁹³ There were attempts to draw the National Party into such an anti-Hungarian but also anti-Yugoslav action. The National Party, however, found out in time that it was a dirty game being played by General Wagner on behalf of the highest military authorities and refused to become a tool of the reactionary circles in Vienna.⁹⁴ Attempts to use the Frontier for the conquest of Bosnia were strongly opposed by Kállay, who felt that it would upset the Serbs.⁹⁵

Both Serbs and Croats were very interested in the question of the Military Frontier's demilitarization. Aware of the significance of this final act in the history of an institution in which they were vitally interested, they wanted to be active players rather than passive observers and a bargaining counter for the high and mighty in Vienna and Budapest. In addition to the material resources of the Frontier, which were by no means negligible, and which they coveted, the Croats and the Serbs wanted to acquire special national and political advantages in the demilitarized Frontier. In order to realize them, they entered into an unequal struggle with Vienna and Budapest, ready to take up arms to defend their national interests. 

Half a year prior to the Emperor's Edict of August 19, 1869, which proclaimed a partial demilitarization of the Border, the Serbian National Party of Independence took up a clear stance in its Becskerek Programme as regards the abolition of the Military March system. The Serbs of Hungary agreed to its demilitarization and attachment to Hungary, but under certain conditions. "In the last resort," they wanted, in the event of demilitarization, "larger Serbian districts to be set up separate from the existing counties, districts, and regimental areas."⁹⁶ In effect, they were asking for a separate administrative and political region and their own autonomy in Hungarian state territory. From several quarters the demand was voiced for the establishment of special frontiersmen assemblies or a diet representing all Serbs.

Frontiersmen from the Croatian part of the Frontier feared that demilitarization would cause them to lose some of their privileges, particularly those concerning the exploitation of forests and meadowlands. Although for years they had been demanding the abolition of the Frontier and unification with Civil Croatia, they were now against it because of Hungary, whose rule they refused to recognize. Similar to the demands set by the Serbs in southern Hungary, the Croats also asked for the convocation of a special assembly of all frontiersmen. This idea was developed in a pamphlet by the well-known Serbian politician and writer, Ognjeslav Utjesenovic Ostrozinski.⁹⁷

In this pamphlet, which had several printings, Utjesenovic elaborated a comprehensive political programme. The programme, which was anti-Hungarian in spirit, was designed to take advantage of the question of the Frontier's demilitarization to press for a revision of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise and for replacement of the dualist with a federal system. Since its author took care of the special interests of the frontiersmen, of their privileges and their forests, the pamphlet was taken up by a wide readership as a political bible.⁹⁸

As the political programmes of the Serbs and Croats took shape during the debate on the Frontier's demilitarization, it was found that while there were many similarities, there were also certain differences. One of them, which was essential in character, pertained to the question of a special frontiersmen's assembly, i.e., to the question of the formation of a separate frontier territory. Whereas the Serbs were in favour of this demand, the Croatian National Party was dead against it. Having no separate territory of their own within the Monarchy, for which they had fought for centuries, the Serbs saw the demilitarization of the Frontier as the last possible opportunity for the realization of their national ideal. The Croats of the National Party, who had their own state, wanted to enlarge it and strengthen it by the annexation of the Frontier. They feared that a frontiersmen's assembly, convened to discuss demilitarization, might turn into a permanent and constitutionally founded institution, thereby putting off the question of the annexation of the Frontier territory for an indefinite time. This solution was also possible because the highest military circles, hostile to Hungarians and dualism, were against the attachment of the Frontier to Hungary or to Croatia and wanted it instead to receive a separate administration and a separate assembly of its own. This was openly advocated by the Viennese newspaper Zukunft, close to the military circles of the Monarchy and an irreconcilable opponent of dualism. It ardently defended the interests of the frontiersmen and incited them to oppose demilitarization and the incorporation of the Military Frontier into Hungary. Mindful of this, Hungarian politicians feared an alliance between the Serbian and Croatian opposition parties and the Viennese military party. They were particularly alarmed by the fact that Svetozar Miletic had been to see Baron Kuhn, Austro-Hungarian minister of war, and had demanded that a separate territory be created out of the Military Frontier. They were confused because the military authorities had permitted the National Party's newspaper Zatocnik and Pavlovic's Pancevac to attack Hungarian policy and Hungarian politicians. It served them as new evidence of the links between the military circles and the Serbian and Croatian opposition, for these newspapers, as well as Zastava, had allegedly disseminated "much dangerous and inflammatory material" throughout the Frontier.

The movement in the Military Frontier which had grown out of the frontiersmen's dissatisfaction with the method of demilitarization very soon acquired an all-Croatian and all-Serbian character. It was led by the two strongest political parties of the Serbs and Croats, whose seats were outside the Military Frontier, in the civil areas of Croatia and Hungary. Owing to the fact that the leaderships of the Croatian National Party and the Serbian National Freethinkers Party were heading the movement, it acquired certain very definite national and political features. The Croatian National Party, which according to Levin Rauch was camped in the Military Frontier, "using all disposable means to thwart the Government's intentions," wanted by aiding the movement in the Frontier area to bring pressure to bear on the Hungarian government for revision of the Nagodba with Hungary. The Serbs, as has already been said, were trying to create their own autonomous territory. In this respect, they were more radical than the Croatian Nationals. It is true that their plans were more difficult to realize, but they had a better organized and more single-minded approach than the Croats. Whereas the Croatian National Party used only legitimate means in their political struggle, the Serbs were getting ready for an uprising. Nonetheless, their links with the Croatian National Party became stronger, and sense of solidarity more pronounced.

In their struggle with the Hungarians against the demilitarization of the Frontier, the Serbs and Croats enjoyed at some moments a degree of backing from Serbia's Regency. Supporting them in their struggle against the Hungarians, the government of Serbia in 1871 permitted a pamphlet entitled Granicari i carski reskript (Frontiersmen and the Imperial Edict) to be printed in Belgrade. While the Serbs under the leadership of the United Serbian Youth engaged in organizational, military and psychological preparations for the uprising, in which the frontiersmen were to play an important role in the liberation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Eugen Kvaternik realized a long cherished dream. Early in October 1871, with a few of his followers in the Ogulin region, in the village of Rakovica near the Plitvice Lakes mounted an armed coup with the intention of freeing the people from the "Swabian-Magyar rule" and of replacing the Military Frontier status with "free counties." Failing to meet with the expected response from the frontiersmen, Kvaternik's rebellion, which began on October 5th, was suppressed after six days. One of the victims was its leader, who in the interim, as "regent," had appointed a provisional government and ministers. We do not yet know the reasons which prompted Kvaternik to rebel, although it is known that the frontiersmen of the Ogulin Regiment had been giving their officers a great deal of uneasiness during the movement following the demilitarization of the Frontier. This was probably the reason why Kvaternik, a preeminent Croatian nationalist, who did not recognize the ethnic name of the Serbs or their national individuality, had tried to organize a rebellion in an area in which the Serbian majority was undisputed. With the suppression of the Rakovica rebellion, the last Croatian attempt to use the Frontier and frontiersmen in the struggle for national liberation and unification had failed.

Just as abortive was the attempt by the United Serbian Youth to instigate, with the help of the frontiersmen, an insurrection against Turkey in January or early February 1872. The rebels won Montenegro over to their plan and counted on assistance from the government of Serbia. Negotiations had been conducted but without any real result. The regents pretended to approve the United Youth's plans but in effect tried to foil them. In this they had backing from Russia, which at this time did not wish to open up the Eastern Question.

The entire activity of the United Youth was under constant surveillance by the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service. As a result, the authorities were informed of many of the secret intentions of this organization and had taken counter measures to nip them in the bud. One report from Novi Sad, dated October 28, 1871, said: "We find that the Slavs, particularly the Serbs from here, then from the Military Frontier and particularly those from Serbia, are extremely dangerous for our Motherland because everyone here states loud and clear that the revolution is bound to break out by next spring. I conclude from it that there is probably in Serbia a secret committee, which it would be highly desirable to check." The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister reported on March 21, 1872, to the Hungarian prime minister that Serbian agitation made the situation extremely grave. He claimed that there were links between politically dangerous individuals from Novi Sad and Belgrade, and that Svetozar Miletic was in collusion with Regent Ristic. He went on to write: "The alarming reports about the imminent uprisings in Bosnia, reports about arms smuggling into that area, and finally ferment in the Military Frontier, which cannot be ignored, call for immediate cooperation among all the competent state organs in order to make certain that any planned upheavals in the neighbouring country should not impinge on our state territory." The minister recommended "the most energetic measures to suppress the movement within the Monarchy in good time and prevent it from coinciding with any possible movement outside it." Finally, lest there be any delay in undertaking the necessary counter-measures, the monarch, early in April 1872, bestowed upon all the grand zupans in southern Hungary, which was inhabited by Serbs, all the powers of royal commissars, "so that they might immediately take the necessary steps on their own, in the event of any emergency situations." For the same reasons, the Hungarian ministry of defence, in agreement with the common ministry of war, was instructed to "take the necessary decisions in regard to the relocation of military units so that there should be a sufficient number of troops stationed in the Serbian lands." All this was to be carried out in a manner "which would not cause any major disquiet."

It is more than certain that these measures and the many others undertaken by the governments of Vienna and Budapest impeded the United Youth in its intention to start an uprising in Bosnia. The uprising, however, did not take place mainly because the regents of Serbia as well as Russia were against it, but also because there was no singleness of purpose within the ranks of the youth organization. At any rate, this last and very ambitious plan for the liberation of Bosnia and Hercegovina with the help of the frontiersmen suffered failure as had many previous ones. It denoted the failure of Serbian as well as Croatian policies, because neither of them, either separately or jointly, managed to make use of the exceptional military potential of the Frontier. It would be wrong to think that international circumstances were not favourable for it. However, this failure can be explained by the disinclination of the great powers to let the Eastern Question be resolved by force of arms, rebellions, and uprisings by the interested Balkan peoples. Furthermore, it must be admitted that the Serbs and the Croats did not use the Frontier to further their national aims because in the last stage of its existence they were not yet competent to carry out such a major national task, even though they had dreamed about it so much and expended so much energy planning it. When the institution of the Military March was finally abolished in 1873, the greatest benefit was reaped by the Hungarians and the least by the Serbs and Croats. The national movements of Croats and Serbs, who no longer had behind them several tens of thousands of well-armed and well-trained frontiersmen, ready to serve the interests of their people, lost momentum. This was a major reason, among a number of others, why the national movements of Serbs and Croats in the 1870s started to decline.

Biblioteka | Serbs And The 1873 Revision Of The Croato-Hungarian Nagodba

Copyright © 1997 by Vasilije Krestic
Copyright © 1997 by BIGZ , Beograd
Copyright © 1998 by Serbian Unity Congress