When Rauch was forced to abandon his post as Ban at the end of January 1871 and Koloman Bedekovic was appointed in his stead, the Serbs considered that it was only the first step in the realization of their goals. They impatiently awaited the forthcoming elections for the Sabor, believing that it would be the second step in which the Nationalist opposition of the Serbs and Croats would gain a Sabor majority and take the reins of power from the Unionists. The Serbs of Srem therefore made thorough preparations for the forthcoming elections. The entire Serbian opposition press from southern Hungary, including Zastava, Pancevac, Narod, and Glas naroda, was committed to the electoral struggle against the Unionists. At the end of January 1871, a conference of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party was held in Novi Sad, to discuss organization of the election campaign in Srem. It was decided that an executive committee would be set up in Vukovar to coordinate the campaign and that it would maintain continuous links with the central committee of the National Party in Zagreb. The executive committee was to organize an electoral convention at one of the larger towns in Srem, and in the spirit of the newly forged political unity between the Serbs and Croats, and in case of need, put forward a well-known National Party member from other parts of Croatia, if his election there was made impossible. To avoid any confusion, Miletic's Zastava published a list of the names of the Unionist candidates and told voters not to vote for them but to cast their ballots instead for the tried and true candidates of the National Party, regardless of whether they were Croats or Serbs.32 Joining the struggle against the Unionists and their regime, Panta Popovic's Glas naroda pointed out that only traitors would support the government's candidates and that "a loyal Serb would not do that."33 A special target for the Serbian press was Svetozar Kusevic, the grand zupan of the Srem county and leader of the Unionists there, who had surrounded himself with a group of sycophantic civil servants, whose loyalty to the government during the elections was remunerated with resources from the state and the county coffers.34

In order to unmask the corruption of the Unionist regime in Croatia, Dr. Stevan Pavlovic, deputy from Novi Sad, in an interpellation on March 22, 1871, in the Hungarian Diet, asked the minister of finances whether it was correct that the former Ban Rauch had received 91,600 forints from the state treasury and had not yet accounted for that money. If this was true, Pavlovic demanded that the minister explain why Rauch had not yet accounted for the money and what steps would be taken against him to make sure that the money was recovered.35

Well organized, with powerful support from the entire Serbian National Freethinkers Party, the people of Srem held a campaign rally in Ilok, on March 22, 1871, which was attended by about 400 Serbs and Croats, supporters of the National Party. The publicity leaflets invited all the people of Srem to come, "irrespective of religion and nationality," because neither religion nor nationality should stand in the way where "freedom, constitutionality and progress" in a common state were at stake. In addition to demands for the restoration of the county's autonomy and free parliamentary elections, the gathering at Ilok called out the slogans, "Long live freedom!" and "Long live brotherhood among nations!" which clearly showed that the Serbs and Croats in Srem had achieved unity in their struggle against the Nagodba. Overlooking national differences, the Serbs of Srem, in the spirit of the agreement between Regent Ristic and Bishop Strossmayer, set aside all religious differences in the May elections. They voted for the National Party candidates, who included two Catholic priests.36 As a result, out of the total of seven constituencies, the Nationalists won six and the Unionists only one. The National Party scored a sweeping victory throughout the country, winning 51 out of 65 seats.

The National Party's success made the Serbs close ranks with the Croatian Nationalists. The Serbian National Freethinkers Party believed that after this resounding victory, the shameful link between Croatia and Hungary must be severed; accordingly, Pancevac came out after the electoral victory with a comprehensive programme, to wit: "The Triune Kingdom shall become a free and independent country; its citizens shall be their own masters and not Hungarian and German lackeys; there will be freedom of script, speech, meeting and assembly, and freedom of the press will only be denied to alien vagabonds, who cast aspersions on people's honour, while our best sons have to flee the country. The National Party will strive for the following objectives: that the Krajina, Dalmatia and Rijeka be amalgamated into a single body with Croatia and Slavonia; that the Sabor elect its own Ban and submit its choice to the King for confirmation; that taxes from the Triune Kingdom should flow into the coffers of that same Kingdom and not into Hungary's coffers; that taxes be lowered as much as possible, especially poll taxes and house taxes, and that these should not be collected by force; that the land troops should not be commanded by the Hungarian minister; that only the sons of the Triune Kingdom may elect and be elected to the parliament of the said Kingdom; that the people should part ways with the landed gentry and obtain their own forests and meadowlands; that a just vineyard tax, tithe, wine tax, milling fees and hunting tax be introduced; that judges be impartial, which they can only be when they are independent; that the Triune Kingdom should be made equal with Hungary...."37

Reflecting the views of the left wing of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party, Pancevac was radical in all its demands. However, not all the Serbs from Croatia or Hungary, although for the most part followers of Miletic and his party, joined its ranks. Differences emerged over the attitude taken to the Austro-Hungarian and Croato-Hungarian Compromises, of which more will be said later.

On the eve of the May elections and following the National Party's victory, it became obvious that the Serbian government did not have a passive stance vis-r-vis events in Croatia. The mouthpiece of the Regency, Jedinstvo, which reflected the policies of Jovan Ristic,38 more and more often openly came to the defence of Croatian interests in regard to Hungary, in accordance with the policy of the National Party.39 Kállay wrote that Jedinstvo daily printed articles which not only showed sympathy for the aspirations of the Croatian opposition but also incited and encouraged this opposition. The consul was less upset by the tone and contents of the texts than by the fact that Jedinstvo reprinted articles from the Novi Sad and Zagreb opposition press without giving any editorial comment, as if they were the government's official policies. He concluded from it that the Regency, covertly rather than openly, was lending moral support to the enemies of Austria-Hungary. He requested Andrássy to authorize him to demand clarification on whether Serbia was a sincere friend or an adversary of Austria-Hungary.40 Having obtained the necessary authorization, in mid-July 1871, Kállay told Serbian Regents Milivoj Petrovic-Blaznavac and Ristic that "there are signs which indicate that the Serbian government wants to come closer... to the Serbian and Croatian opposition." Without mincing words, he made it clear that the government of Serbia should choose to maintain good relations either with Austria-Hungary or with Novi Sad and Zagreb, "because to be friendly with both is not possible." Although Ristic strongly denied to Kállay that there was any rapprochement between the Serbian government and the Croats and Serbs from Hungary, he declared, early in September 1871 before the well-known publicist, Dr. Mihailo Rozen, that "Hungary will not have an easy time with the Croats, because the leaders of the Croatian National Party all promised the Serbian government in writing not to come to any agreement with Hungary's government without it."41

Serbo-Hungarian relations deteriorated with each passing day, as Serbia's links with the Croat opposition strengthened. One of the reasons for the deterioration of these relations was certainly the not-guilty verdict exonerating the former Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic and the other persons suspected of complicity in the assassination of Prince Mihailo.42 The Serbian opposition in Hungary linked this verdict directly with the friendly ties between the Regency and the Croatian National Party.43 Albeit not formal, an actual split between Serbia and Hungary took place in October 1871, after Prince Milan's journey to Livadia, where he met Russian Tsar Alexander II. This journey marked the end of the policy of reliance on Austria-Hungary, which Serbia had pursued because of the Austrian statesmen's promises that with their help Serbia would receive Bosnia and Hercegovina. Even earlier, before the Serbian government started getting closer to Russia and farther from Austria-Hungary, the Monarchy's politicians viewed with suspicion the unification of the Serbian and Croatian political movements, as we have already seen in the case of Consul Kállay. This unity of Serbs and Croats became more dangerous once Russia stood behind it.

Unity of the Serbs and Croats was reaffirmed after the elections in the Proclamation of September 20, 1871, known as the Rujanski Manifest (The September Manifesto). After the Sabor convened and recessed three times in succession, the National Party issued a proclamation to the voters, sharply criticizing Rauch's unconstitutional rule and the Nagodba itself. The 54 signatories of the Manifesto numbered all the Serbian deputies from the ranks of the National Party, which clearly showed that the Croat and Serb opposition had firmly resolved to continue their struggle. The Manifesto attracted a great deal of attention from both the Croatian and the Serbian public, and alarmed the leading politicians of Hungary.44 Only two days after its publication, and in order to break up the unity of the Serbs and Croats, which he obviously feared, Kállay, in conversation with György Klapka, a well-known Hungarian general of 1848, told him "the reasons for which Serbia had turned away" from Austria-Hungary, and drew his attention to the "danger posed by the Croatian question." He begged Klapka to "talk with Andrássy and warn him that he should arrive at an agreement with the Croats," because, as Kállay put it, in this way he would obtain the key to South Slav politics.45 This shows that Kállay, in September 1871, closely linked the question of the revision of the Croato-Hungarian Nagodba to the strained relations with Serbia and solidarity of all Serbs with the Croatian Nationalists and their national and political aspirations. For several months, one of Kállay's main political preoccupations was to try and persuade Andrássy and Lónyay that because of disturbed relations with Serbia and the political unity of Serbs and Croats, they should hurry to reach an understanding with the Croatian Nationalists and thus forestall any unpleasant surprises which the Southern Slavs might give them in the Balkans. Kállay was stubborn, systematic, and persuasive in his endeavours at the end of 1871 and early in 1872, as well he might have been, for this was the time when the United Serbian Youth was busy trying to foment an uprising against Turkey for the liberation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, attempting to win over for it not only Montenegro but also the government of Serbia.46 Faced with the facts which Kállay presented to his superiors in Budapest and Vienna in connection with Serbia and the unity of the Serbs and Croats,47 the Hungarian rulers agreed to negotiate with the National Party. Talks began in Vienna in the last weeks of December 1871.

Before the National Party's delegates went to Vienna to negotiate revision of the Nagodba, in line with their earlier agreement with the government of Serbia, they sought its advice and wanted to discuss the whole matter. Although Serbia's government was in principle against a compromise between the National Party and the Hungarians, it did not want to dissuade it. Ristic explained why in these words: "Whatever advice we give them, they will pursue their own interests. If they do not come to an agreement while we try to persuade them against it, we will be taking them upon our backs, and we may be drawn into a struggle with their government and become embroiled, so that we are neither here nor there. What we should do is say: You do whatever is best for you; our friendship for you is assured."48 However, despite Ristic's remarks, the government of Serbia did intervene in the negotiations. When these began, the government authorized Toncic to tell the National Party not to give way to the Hungarians as regards Croatia's legal status vis-r-vis Hungary and the scope of its autonomy. It recommended that an agreement be reached on economic matters, because it believed that in that area Croatia was dependent on Hungary.49

Generally speaking, there was a strong anti-Hungarian mood at that time in the official circles of Serbia. Convinced that the Hungarians, led by Andrássy, were trying to undermine Serbia, Filip Hristic, Serbian envoy in Constantinople, suggested to Ristic that the government should make peace with Miletic and, together with him, through his newspaper Zastava, and with the Croats, and if possible also with the Czechs, make "the greatest possible amount of confusion" in Hungary.50 At the time when the talks were going on in Vienna, Kállay warned Blaznavac and Ristic that the Serbian government was in many cases assuming a hostile stance towards Austria-Hungary. As proof of Serbia's hostile actions against Austria-Hungary, the Consul cited Captain Horvatovic's mission in the Military Frontier and the pamphlet, Granicari i carski reskript. Rec u svoje vreme (The Frontiersmen and the Imperial Edict. A Word in Time), which was printed in Belgrade in several thousand copies. Andrássy was informed that the pamphlet incited the frontiersmen to rise and asked Kállay to intercede with the Regent to have its printing stopped or at least the copies confiscated. However, Kállay was not successful, for Blaznavac and Ristic did not want to comply with his demand. The Consul was particularly angry with Ristic, claiming that he wished to gain popularity and was currying favour with the United Youth, the Croatian National Party, and the Russians. That Serbia was truly beginning to interfere in Austria-Hungary's internal affairs was confirmed by the commander of the Military Frontier, Vice-Marshal Mollinary, who informed Hungarian Prime Minister Lónyay that in Belgrade pressure was openly being put on the government of Serbia to oppose Nagodba talks between Hungary and the Croatian National Party.52

Having firmly convinced himself that Serbia had turned its back on Austria-Hungary and that it was even working against it, Consul Kállay considered that it was in the best interest of Vienna and Budapest to break up the existing political unity between the Serbs and Croats and try to turn them against one another. He first proposed to soften the National Party's resistance by bribing its leaders with the money which would be obtained from the sale of Krajina forests.53 Then, on January 20, 1872, Kállay came up with some new proposals. He wrote to Andrássy54 that the union of Serbs and Croats was dangerous for the interests of the Monarchy, "in fact, highly dangerous." But he pointed out that "this union is only possible... if neither of the two races has anything to hope for from us." Otherwise, Kállay said, "agreement between the Serbs and Croats is unimaginable, because their interests and aspirations are diametrically opposed." "Serbia only dreams of creating a Greater Serbia, which, in addition to the present one, would encompass Bosnia and Hercegovina, and later possibly also Croatia and Dalmatia, but under Serbia's hegemony. In Croatia they are also dreaming of a Greater Croatia, which would embrace Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and later possibly also Serbia, but under Croatia's hegemony. These two factors (Croatia and Serbia) not only will not renounce their hegemony for the sake of the other, but, as far as I know them, will be prepared to enter into a bloody war over it. It is only if both of them realize that the danger comes from us, that they would temporarily unite, but their centuries-old rivalry will invariably be renewed. This temporary union, while not bringing about our complete ruin, would undoubtedly weaken us, especially if there is to be war with Russia." Kállay went on to say: "We certainly must bring one of the two elements over to us. The Croats are more educated, better off and are living in stabler political conditions than the Serbs, and besides, they are fully dependent on us, whereas Serbia is the vassal of a foreign state and is therefore only capable of cautious diplomatic action. Our relations with Croatia hold the key to the South Slav question. The Serbian government has realized the danger threatening Serbia if there were to be a reconciliation between Croatia and Hungary, and it is therefore doing everything to prevent it. If a sincere compromise is struck with Croatia, the Croats will be the first to turn against the Serbs, not only in Serbia but also in Croatia itself, where there are many Orthodox Serbs, and this is what will cause quarrels among the Serbs in Hungary. In my modest opinion, a new compromise with Croatia would produce an indirect but no less important result, which is the withering away and eventual disappearance of the Serbian element in Backa and Banat. Furthermore, if Croatia were to obtain a free hand, it would immediately start covert agitation in Bosnia, undoubtedly with much more success than Serbia had, because the latter can only count on the Orthodox element, which makes up one half of the population. However, they are living in such miserable conditions that they are not capable of any action, whereas the Croats would meet with sympathy not only from the Bosnian Catholics but also from among the Bosnian Muslims." Said Kállay, "a result of this secret agitation by Croatia would be to squeeze Serbia out of the Balkan Peninsula and from the position which it wishes to hold among the Christian Slavs there. A natural aftermath of this squeezing out would be a general weakening of the Serb element. The strengthening of Croatia, if it is done at the expense of the Serbs, cannot be dangerous for us because the limits of their ethnic expansion are narrowly compressed but in any case, once they are in union with us, whatever works to Croatia's benefit would also be good for us. For these reasons, may I be permitted to express my opinion that the Croatian Nagodba is one of the most important issues and that the future size of Hungary greatly depends on its proper solution." If Croatia is "finally pacified" with the Nagodba, Kállay said, "not only shall we split up the Southern Slavs, but we shall have gained a free hand for further divisions." For this reason, the Consul requested Andrássy and Lónyay to be most attentive to the Hungaro-Croatian state community in their current negotiations, "and in other questions to be yielding to the Croatian demands." He believed that the Nagodba should emphasize that "Croatia is an associated state to the Hungarian crown," which would resolve everything, because, "whatever autonomy the Croats get, what can they do with it? Where can they go?" Kállay was in favour of giving the Croats the widest possible autonomy because he thought that it would assure a closer union with the Hungarians. Furthermore, giving them broad autonomy would make Croatia more attractive to the other South Slavs, particularly those in Bosnia and Hercegovina, where he wanted to direct Croat ambitions, not because he was anxious to satisfy them, but because "it would be to the detriment of Serbian aspirations," and in line with the interests of Austria-Hungary. At the end of his report, Kállay wrote: "May the Lord grant that a satisfactory union with Croatia comes about as soon as possible."55 Lajos Jekelfalussy, special envoy of the Hungarian government, who in the spring of 1872 was sent to the Serb-inhabited southern Hungarian counties to study local conditions, also came to the conclusion that the South Slav movement could only be headed off by a compromise between Croatia and Hungary. Like Kállay, he also asked that the state treaty between Croatia and Hungary should only preserve the essence of the union. He believed that the Croats, satisfied with the compromise, would drift away from Svetozar Miletic's Serbian movement and that the latter would then be reduced to a limited territorial area with greatly reduced room for action. These and other proposals made by Jekelfalussy on how to check the Serbian movement in Hungary, prevent Miletic's collaboration with the Serbian government and prevent political unity between Serbs and Croats, were duly reported to Emperor Francis Joseph. Some of these proposals were approved, and concrete measures were taken accordingly.

Kállay's and Jekelfalussy's writings, as well as numerous other already reported facts, suggest that the Austro-Hungarian authorities, at the end of 1871 and early in 1872, were looking for ways and means of breaking the unity between the Serbs and Croats. The idea had already begun to crystallize that the revision of the Croato-Hungarian Compromise might be the desired apple of discord, inducing the satisfied Croats to abandon the Serbs and even turn against them. When we know these infernal plans, which soon afterwards, with some modifications, were realized with the revision of the Nagodba, it is then clear that the treaty of 1873, like the one of 1868, did not come into being as a result of the balance of forces between Croatia and Hungary. The revision of the Nagodba, as well as the Nagodba itself, resulted from a number of factors, the Serbs and Serbia being one of the most important. Had Austria-Hungary not sensed a threat from Serbia and the Serbs, had it not been aware of the danger of a united national and political movement of the Serbs and Croats that would be headed by Serbia, Croatia would hardly have obtained a revision, and it would have been even harder for the National Party to overthrow the Unionists without Serbian help and assume power. Documents clearly show that the Serbs and Serbia were such an important factor in the events relating to the revised Nagodba that they simply could not be bypassed. Furthermore, histories of the Nagodba's revision which fail to give consideration to this factor have been impoverished and oversimplified, for they did not have this important dimension which throws new light upon it and permits its fuller understanding and interpretation. 

Biblioteka | Capitulation of the Croatian National Party

Copyright © 1997 by Vasilije Krestic
Copyright © 1997 by BIGZ , Beograd
Copyright © 1998 by Serbian Unity Congress