The Serbian opposition in Hungary and Croatia acted in conjunction with the anti-Nagodba policy conducted by the Serbian government. Organized within the Serbian National Freethinkers Party, the opposition made up of Serbs from Croatia and Hungary was not prepared to grant any concessions to the Hungarians and Croatian Unionists. For these reasons it did not condone negotiations between the Hungarian government and individual members of the National Party. It wanted first to see the Croatian Sabor come into session, whereupon it would select men from its ranks to conduct the talks.⁷⁸ When, at the end of December 1871, the Croatian Nationalists went to negotiate anyway, the Serbian opposition rejected all possible links with the Unionists.⁷⁹ It was against the revision of the Nagodba, because it believed that the acceptance of the revision would imply recognition of the 1868 Nagodba, which it had rejected lock, stock and barrel. The only legal possibility for negotiations with the Hungarians was seen by the Serbian National Freethinkers Party in Article 42 of the Croatian Sabor Act of 1861. It wanted this article of the Act to be the starting point of negotiations on Croatia's full autonomy, which would consist in the Ban's accountability to the Croatian Sabor, full independence of Croatian finances, and the right of the Croatian Sabor to determine the proportional quota for common expenditure with Hungary, and which would generally reflect the full internal independence of Croatia. The Serbian National Freethinkers Party did not call for the breaking off of the union between Croatia and Hungary, but, as Zastava pointed out, for the establishment of a state link "which is not shameful and detrimental to the Triune Kingdom."⁸⁰

When the Croatian Sabor was dissolved on January 19, 1872, the Serbian opposition from Hungary and Croatia denounced it as an act doing injury to "the dignity of the Sabor and national pride." Miletic made a protest in the Hungarian Diet, and his Zastava wrote that the dissolving of the Sabor cut "the last thread of mutual understanding" and that for the Serbian and Croatian people there was no other way but to "gather strength for their new struggle."⁸¹ Pavlovic's Pancevac almost openly fomented trouble when it wrote that it admired the "lamb-like meekness with which the people bore this injury in silence" and pointed out that "Hungarian mischief-making with this country and people has already exceeded all measure" and it would be very fortunate "if it does not bring consequences which may be dangerous for peace and order in this country." The entire Serbian opposition regarded the dissolution of the Sabor as a pretext for the beginning of a new struggle between the government and the people, in which it demanded of the latter to grant full trust to the National Party.⁸²

Because of the strongly expressed anti-Nagodba sentiments, the Hungarian and German press, which reflected the government's interests, sharply attacked the Serbian opposition. The strongest attacks were directed against Miletic, who was accused of goading and instigating the Nationalists not to make peace with the Hungarians.⁸³ At the same time, the Serbian opposition press vociferously demanded the closest possible political links between the Serbs and Croats, harmony and unity. An excerpt from an article in Subotic's Narod provides a good illustration: "The good point about the common suffering of related tribes is that the tribal quarrels and dissensions are set aside, mutual injuries are forgiven and forgotten, and the kindred tribes are banding more tightly together, realizing the value of kinship. The good point about the common sufferings of the Croats and Serbs is that the old quarrels and disputes about their nations are today swept aside as something belonging to the past, which in the present makes no sense. Today historians and linguists may debate what is Serbian and what is Croatian; hotheads may carry the bigotry of script to extremes; reactionaries may point out differences between denominations - but debates about Serbianism and Croatianism can no longer affect the trend of the Serbo-Croatian people.'s policy. Thanks to the Austrian and Hungarian policies, the difference in policies between the Serbs and Croats has to cease. The Croats have been able to realize that they should support neither Austrian nor Hungarian policies, but hold their own, once their policy becomes pure Croatian, once Croatianism ceases to be an instrument of Austrian and Hungarian policy or of clerical propaganda against Serbianism. And by the same token, once Serbianism ceases to be the instrument of Serbia's selfish policy, or the instrument of the Orthodox clergy in the hands of Austrian and Hungarian reactionaries against Croatianism, then there is no longer any difference in policies between the Serbs and Croats, and then there can be only one people, the Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian people." Narod wrote further on: "We, the Southern Slavs, can only have a future in togetherness; hence we must support one another. Until such time as the tribal differences created by history, dialects, confessions, customs and state and political separateness have been erased, one tribe must not be intent on absorbing the other, but each in its own sphere should work toward this common future."

Like Subotic's Narod, Jovan Jovanovic Zmaj's Ziza also tried to foster harmony and brotherhood between the Serbs and Croats. Politically very committed, an unwavering follower of Svetozar Miletic and the Serbian National Freethinkers Party, Jovan Jovanovic here again placed his poetic talent in the service of national interests when in accordance with the Becskerek Programme he raised his voice against the Nagodba, its revision, and against all those who were in favour of it. Ridiculing Baron Jovan Zivkovic, who belonged to the group of moderate Unionists and advocated fusion with the Nationalists provided they recognized the Nagodba of 1868, he scourged his political programme and his Unionists, setting his criticism to verse:

The more threatening your spectre,

The stronger our faith

Which hunger will not shake.

A heroic people will not change their faith

In days of trials.

We trust in our stalwart hearts,

We rely on fraternal bonds,

We follow the Serbian and Croatian star.

The desire for close political links between the Serbs and Croats was very pronounced at this time and was an essential part of the Becskerek Programme. It was noticeable, however, that during January and February 1872, the Serbian opposition laid more than usual stress on the need for harmony and unity of the Serbian and Croatian political movements and national aims. This was due to a sudden change in the political drift of the Croatian National Party, its renunciation of its anti-dualist opposition and the acceptance of the 1868 Act of Compromise as the platform for its further activity. In other words, when the leaders of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party realized that the Croatian National Party had decided to abandon the arena of anti-dualist struggle, and in order not to remain isolated vis-r-vis the Hungarians, they called for unity more forcefully than before. The leading Serbian newspapers, Zastava and Narod, not only abstained from denouncing their allies for abandoning the opposition struggle, but using skilful wording and sophistry justified the policy of the National Party and its negotiations with the Hungarian government, only occasionally criticizing it mildly for being too compliant.

With this stance, the Serbian opposition wanted to preserve its hard won political unity and to bring the National Party back onto the road of anti-dualist struggle. Miletic's followers put in considerable effort to dig the deepest possible gulf between the Nationalists and Unionists, who were considering a merger. Zastava stressed the differences between the programmes of the Nationalists and Unionists, claiming that the former were seeking the broadening and the latter the narrowing of national and popular rights, that for the former, a link with Hungary was a means of achieving their goal, while for the latter, this link was a goal in itself which they wanted to achieve.

Dissatisfied with the National Party leaders' excessive indulgence towards the Hungarians, and convinced that there were no real reasons for it, in the second half of March 1872, Miletic's followers informed the public on the points where they disagreed with the Croatian Nationalists. Among other things, they wanted Hungary to recognize Rijeka and the Croatian Littoral as a component part of the Croatian lands, within which Hungary's interests would be safeguarded in this city and its environs. They considered that no state treaty should be concluded between Hungary and Croatia without the previous consent of the inhabitants of the Military Frontier. Aware that the Military Frontier could not be demilitarized in a hurry, they pointed out that "the matter at stake is not an immediate demilitarization; it is that Krajina should have a voice in the settlement of the state dispensation and that it should wield its influence also in the transitional period in all political, judicial, civic and other domains of public and private law."

The Serbian opposition was unhappy over the narrow scope of the self-government given to Croatia under the 1868 Nagodba and sought to broaden it as much as possible. More than this, it wanted to secure guarantees for its realization. But those guarantees which the leaders of the Croatian National Party asked for in the negotiations did not satisfy the Serbian opposition. The Nationalist leaders demanded that the ban should not depend on the minister in charge of Croatian affairs, least of all in legislative and executive proposals and in his petitions. They also wanted the chiefs of various departments in the Croatian government to be accountable for their acts. Zastava wrote that these guarantees were not sufficient, and on behalf of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party it suggested that the ban should be appointed directly by the Emperor himself, thus circumventing the requirement of recommendation and counter-signature by the Hungarian prime minister. The reason given by Zastava was that "Croatia and Slavonia must have guarantees that the ban will follow the majority in the Croatian Sabor, even if its policy is contrary to that of the Hungarian government, because if the Hungarian government rather than the Croatian Sabor determined the direction of internal autonomous policy, then autonomy would be an empty word, which it is today." As regards other matters, the Serbian opposition was on the same or similar ground as the Croatian National Party. Lest there should be any undesired disagreements because of the existing differences, the representatives of the Serbian opposition declared that they did not doubt the honesty and patriotic intentions of the leadership of the National Party, but that they were not ready to yield and agree to half-baked and provisional solutions. Should such solutions nevertheless be adopted, they hinted at the possibility of the formation of a new Croatian Radical Party from discontented Nationalists, who at this time were in the minority, but, as pointed out by Zastava, might in due course become "a leavening agent for the future."

At the moment when the leadership of the Croatian National Party, at the end of 1871 and beginning of 1872, made an about-turn by abandoning the parliamentary struggle, it included several prominent Serbian politicians in its ranks. These politicians not only approved the new course of action by the National Party but, like Supreme Court justice Maksimilijan Prica and attorney Nikola Krestic, played an important role in it. Prica and Krestic belonged to the still very thin stratum of the Serbian bourgeois society in Croatia who had come to the conclusion that the continued struggle against Hungarians could do them more harm than good. They represented the wealthy middle class, notably merchants, who had their minds set on profitable business with Budapest and Viennese financial, industrial and commercial circles and wanted peace rather than war with the Hungarians.⁹⁰ Furthermore, they represented the interests of the dependent intelligentsia holding various civil service posts, who were political fence-sitters and ready to cooperate with whatever party was in a position to offer them more. When they came to the conclusion that the leaders of the National Party also favoured peace and agreement with the Hungarian government, Prica and Krestic did not want to be overtaken by events. They placed themselves at the head of the Croatian pro-Nagodba policy, disregarding the fact that their stance would split the ranks of the solidly unified and the most numerous Serbian National Freethinkers Party. By abandoning the oppositionist struggle and signalling their readiness to recognize the Nagodba, that of 1867 as well as the one of 1868, Prica and Krestic became the protagonists of the subsequently well-known notables' policy. This policy, which came into being in the course of the struggle over the Nagodba revision among the Serbs in Croatia, in the course of time gained in strength and for many years played an important role. At this time, at the end of 1872 and beginning of 1873, it gained a following in the same bourgeois classes of Serbian society in Hungary.⁹¹ The notables' policy in Croatia was endorsed at the time of and after the revision of the Croato-Hungarian Nagodba by those few Serbs who, mostly in order to further their careers, had espoused the Unionist policy. Thus the notables came into being as policies on the revision were coordinated between the former Independents of Mazuranic, who had several years earlier agreed under certain conditions to Schmerling's Reichsrat, and those Unionists who had approved the so-called "honest union" with Hungary. Zastava wrote that the revision of the Nagodba was "the fruit of the embrace between old Independents and new Unionists," whose supporters were mostly "present or future civil servants."⁹² It should be remembered that the Serbian National Freethinkers Party in Croatia had split over the question of the Nagodba revision. Most of its rank and file remained loyal to the policy of the Becskerek Programme, the policy of parliamentary struggle in opposition, while a lesser number went along with the Croatian National Party, its opportunistic policy and the revision of the Nagodba. For the same reasons, as will be seen presently, it led to a split between the Serbs from Hungary and the Croats, a dispute between two of their strongest and largest political parties, which in subsequent decades had far-reaching negative political consequences for both nations. When these facts are borne in mind, it is clear that Béni Kállay's evaluations, expressed on January 20, 1872, that concessions to Croatia granted in the revised Nagodba would bring the two nations into conflict, were founded on an excellent knowledge of relations between the Croats and the Serbs. The Consul's infernal plan worked exactly as he had conceived it. 

In addition to the mentioned notables, members of the National Party, and dependent civil servants, adherents of the Unionists, the conservative-clerical Serbian circles who were at loggerheads with Svetozar Miletic and his party were also prepared to support a compact with the Hungarian government. These elements, not feeling sufficiently strong, had relied on the Hungarian government ever since 1867. This numerically small segment of the Serbian community in Srem was headed by the grand zupan Svetozar Kusevic and the archimandrite of the Grgeteg monastery, German Andjelic.⁹³ They found for their collaborator the known hireling in the pay of the Hungarian government, Dr. Jovan Grujic Jota, who in Novi Sad published the paper Srbski narod and championed a compromise agreement with the Hungarians.

When the Croatian Sabor was dissolved in January 1872, the Serbian National Freethinkers Party started preparations for the electoral campaign. In no way prepared to yield to the Hungarian government and Unionists, their leaders considered that it was of crucial significance for the National Party to defeat its opponents as convincingly as possible. They thought that if it was strong, it would not have to make many concessions. As in previous elections, once again the Serbs devoted particular attention to Srem. With the National Party's victory in Srem, the leaders of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party wanted to show that a vast majority of Serbs were prepared to defend Croatia's national interests to the bitter end. The electoral campaign was well organized. The Unionists' goals were mercilessly unmasked, and the Unionists themselves were shown to be nothing but flunkies of the Hungarian government, careerists who for the sake of personal gain worked against national interests. They were particularly attacked as sowers of dissension and hatred between the Orthodox and Catholics, between the Serbs and Croats.⁹⁵ On the other hand, the National Party's committee in Srem, which managed the electoral campaign, called for unity, for cooperation and brotherhood, and wrote in its proclamation to the voters: "Do not look at another man's confession, because at stake here is not only what is good for the Serbs but what is good and profitable for all of us. If things are bad for the Serb, they cannot be good for the Croat, or German, or Hungarian, and conversely, if they are good for the Serb, they cannot be bad for the Croat, or German, or Hungarian."⁹⁶ Another prominent personality who took part in the electoral campaign through the Serbian opposition press in Hungary was Vaso Pelagic. He called upon the Serbs and Croats to join forces so that "with combined strength and with concerted efforts we shall assume our rightful place as a worthy and happy people in the history of the world." In verses dedicated to the electoral campaign, which celebrated brotherhood, in contrast to the Unionists, who sowed discord, Pelagic said:

Cast a stone at him who pretends

To separate the Serb from the Croat

Whereas in the earlier electoral struggles the Unionists managed to win over broader strata of the population by making them promises of a social character, even though they never intended to fulfil them, the managers of the electoral campaigns in Srem did not limit their activity only to promises of national and civic rights and constitutional freedoms. Like the Unionists, they also promised that in the event of victory, they would try to resolve relations between the former feudalist gentry and serfs to the advantage of the people, and to see to it that, wherever possible, they would obtain "benefits for the people"; that they would call for the construction of railways, canals, and roads, "so that the people can obtain a better price for their sweat and labour"; and that they would try to gain independence for the political administration and judiciary.⁹⁸ The opposition Serbian press from Hungary attentively monitored the electoral moves in Croatia and, in order to help the National Party defeat the Unionists with as wide a margin as possible, sought to expose all the illegitimate doings of the Croatian government. In turn, the Hungarian authorities brought pressure to bear against the Serbian newspapers and took them to court.⁹⁹

Thanks to good party organization, efficient campaigning and coordinated action by the Orthodox and Catholic clergy, the National Party won in Srem in all the constituencies except in Vukovar, where the moderate Unionist, Jovan Zivkovic, was elected. As the National Party throughout Croatia and Slavonia won a total of 47 seats, and the Unionists and moderate Unionists only 28, followers of the opposition from the ranks of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party, those from Hungary as well as those from Croatia and above all from Srem, considered that after this new electoral victory, the Croatian National Party should not make any concessions to the Hungarian government in the latter's demands for the revision of the Nagodba. The Serbian oppositionists did not want to surrender to the Hungarian government preferring to fight in union with the Croats for Croatia's rights and for its broader autonomy, but also for the national liberation and unification of all South Slavs. Presenting this programme to the public, Mihailo Polit-Desancic, a few days before the elections, communicated his views on a joint national and political action by the Serbs and Croats. He wrote: "Zagreb is again showing itself in its full splendour, as the bright spot which receives the rays from the west and pours them on the southeast. These rays reach far and reflect off the weapons which Serbia and Montenegro are holding in their hands for the liberation of their people. The Triune Kingdom is leading the moral struggle for a Yugoslavia. The liberation of Southern Slavs beyond Austria's borders cannot be attempted by the Triune Kingdom. This task must be given to Serbia and Montenegro. But the Triune Kingdom's task is, to foster and promote within the framework of the present Austro-Hungarian state, the cultural development of their brothers beyond the Sava and Una rivers. It would at the same time help to assuage the ferment which was caused by the mutual tribal friction between the Serbs and Croats. That stage has now been overcome, and the ferment has come to an end. The Triune Kingdom has its own tasks, and Serbia and Montenegro theirs, all of them together to civilize the Yugoslavs. In the course of their common trials, during the great efforts of the constitutional struggle, and afterwards in their splendid victory, the Serbs and Croats have learned about each other, about what they have always been, not only brothers but also one and the same people. After the great victory, the Catholics and the Orthodox stood embraced as they cried Victory to each other in one and the same mother tongue. The former differences between the Serbs and Croats are today only memories of a bad dream."¹⁰⁰

This writing by Polit-Desancic and distribution of roles in the future common Serbian and Croatian liberation action were fully in accordance with the policy which Bishop Strossmayer had laid out to Regent Ristic at the end of March 1871, when he wrote that it was both fair and reasonable that he and his followers should leave it to Serbia to judge "when the time is ripe for the undertaking and which methods are to be used for the purpose." It was also in line with the Bishop's statement made to Ristic early in April of the same year: "Not only shall we not place any encumbrances on the Serbian government in the execution of its task, not only shall we not hinder it from annexing Bosnia and Hercegovina, but we shall beg Serbia to take us in as well, if at all possible."

Deeply convinced that only a free and independent Croatia, enjoying full autonomy, was capable of making a contribution to the common action of liberation and unification of the South Slav peoples and their lands, the Serbian opposition was not prepared to yield to the Hungarian government. For this reason, Miletic and his followers precisely proclaimed all the earlier negotiations by populist leaders with the Hungarian government to be null and void and wrote that "there can be no question" of any revision of the Nagodba based on these negotiations.¹⁰¹ When the Hungarian government after the elections again called for a reconciliation between the Unionists and Nationalists, Zastava was dead set against it. It disagreed with the policy of reconciliation "because it is deadly" for the interests of the Triune Kingdom and the people there. Even when acting Ban A. Vakanovic brought to the Croatian Sabor 47 ex officio members of parliament to support the Hungarian government's policy, the Serbian opposition, contrary to the Croatian Nationalists, was loath to give way.¹⁰² It rejected all the demands of the Unionist Party, which the latter put before the Nationalists as a condition for reconciliation. It condemned the opportunistic policy to which the National Party was increasingly inclining, stressing that the Hungarian government and the Unionists "need to be dealt with in a radical manner." Zastava wrote: "However things may turn out, if the National Party wants to survive, it has only one way open to it, and it is one that is radical but strictly legal. It is better for it to wait for the dissolution of the Sabor on that terrain than on the other. In the first case, it will not only maintain its present position among the people but will even increase it, if that is at all possible, whereas in the other case, it would dissipate people's energies." Zastava also wrote: "Should the National Party, motivated by expediency, take the road of opportunism, it will draw the carpet from under its own feet. Those who lead the way in this will not be regarded by us as true friends of the people."¹⁰³

Pavlovic's Pancevac was even more outspoken. It wrote that the Nationalists with their submissive stand would "impair the principle of solidarity which should link the Serbo-Croatian people in the Triune Kingdom with the Serbian and other people of the same blood in Hungary." In this manner, Pancevac pointed out, they would make it obvious that their selfish interests were more important to them than solidarity, supplying "new evidence of divisions among the Slavs, which unfortunately have been found to exist in many recent instances."¹⁰⁴

Contrary to Polit-Desancic's expectation that a victory at the May elections of 1872 would put an end to all differences between the Serbs and Croats, and that the "former differences" between them would be but "memories of a bad dream," this victory, won with the votes of the Serbs and with their unselfish moral support, marked the beginning of new disagreements and conflicts between the Croats and Serbs. Soon after the May elections, the National Party openly espoused an opportunistic policy, jettisoning the September Manifesto and its opposition activity. The rift between it and the Serbian National Freethinkers Party, which had stood by its earlier opposition programme, became inevitable. Like the Serbian government, the leadership of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party, which daily drifted away from the Nationalists, openly sided with Milan Makanac. Zastava wrote that Makanac's "extreme left-wing" party was "the party of the real future, which will be entitled upon demilitarization of Krajina to raise the question of its settlement."¹⁰⁵ A large segment of the Serbian people who were not prepared to accept capitulation to the Hungarian government openly sided with Milan Makanac, whom they glorified in verse:

Long may you live, our granite support,

We are all behind you, Makanac, old sport!

Until the adoption of the revised Nagodba, the Serbian opposition brought strong pressure to bear upon the leadership of the Croatian National Party to abandon opportunistic policies. It took advantage of every convenient occasion to point out the harmful consequences likely to be suffered by the country and the people of Croatia if the anti-Nagodba opposition struggle were to be renounced. The Serbian press warned that the leadership of the National Party was slowly losing the trust of the people, who were not ready to give in to the Hungarian government.¹⁰⁷ Preparing public opinion for the continuance of the struggle on the basis of the Becskerek Programme and urging the leaders of the National Party to fight for greater independence of Croatia vis-r-vis Hungary, Zastava wrote that the outcome of that struggle would show whether "the present national-democratic generation" was worse and weaker "than the aristocratic-feudal generation during the time of Tomo Bakac," the Croatian ban who, defending the Croatians' state individuality, launched the famous slogan that "one kingdom does not lay down the law to another kingdom."¹⁰⁸ The Serbian opposition asked the National Party to rely less on historical rights and constitutionality and to seek strength in the concord and unity of the Serbs and Croats, and not to be a dupe to the promises of the Hungarian rulers, who, by granting small concessions, were bent upon setting the Croats and Serbs at each other's throats.¹⁰⁹ Instead of a policy of expediency, Polit-Desancic recommended to the National Party that it conduct a policy of self-reliance vis-r-vis Hungary, pointing out that "the Triune Kingdom should never despair about its future because it is inhabited by the Serbo-Croatian people, who have support elsewhere and whose future does not depend on Hungary and the Magyars."¹¹⁰

Endeavours by the Serbian opposition to keep the Croatian National Party as an ally in the struggle against Hungarian rule and to forge a common policy in dealing with the Eastern Question produced no result. Fatigued by many years of being in the opposition, and desiring to be rid of the Unionist system of rule, the National Party did not take much notice of its erstwhile Serbian allies or of their warnings. It concluded a compromise agreement which did not satisfy the Croatian and Serbian national interests, but did satisfy those of the Hungarian government. The National Party, in order to bring down the Unionists and take over power, betrayed both its own programme and its alliance with the Serbian opposition which was led by Svetozar Miletic. This is why the revision of the Nagodba is a major watershed in the history of relations between the Serbs and Croats. Dissatisfied with what was gained with the revision, the Serbs of the Serbian National Freethinkers Party attacked it, while the Croatian Nationalists defended it. Thus began the decades-long dispute and conflict which from one year to the next, until the victory of a new course in Croatian politics, widened and deepened in accordance with the earlier mentioned diabolical plan and evil forecasts of Consul Béni Kállay.

According to the Serbian opposition's view, the revised Nagodba was "nothing other than the Nagodba of 1868, badly amended." Miletic's Zastava wrote that nothing was gained by it, "because even what seems to be gained, such as, for example, the change in the financial aspect of the earlier Nagodba, is of a highly problematic nature, since whatever the domestic government of the Triune Kingdom gains on the economic side, it will lose on the moral side." Miletic and his followers thought that the revision of the Nagodba did not bring any improvements, "even politically, in regard to the legal status of the Triune Kingdom vis-r-vis Hungary."¹¹¹ The Serbian opposition claimed that the revised Nagodba gave Croatia not state but only provincial autonomy, turning it into a Hungarian colony.¹¹² Carefully analyzing the revised Nagodba, the Serbian opposition came to the conclusion that the National Party had not achieved any of its programme goals, or, according to Zastava, "not even one single matter of principle: either in regard to an enlarged autonomy, or in regard to the status of the ban and the domestic government, or in regard to financial independence, or in regard to natural resources, forests in particular - in fact, nothing at all."¹¹³ On account of such meagre results, the entire Serbian opposition press in Hungary regarded the revision of the Nagodba as a surrender "by that party which used to call itself National."¹¹⁴

The Serbian opposition did not merely point to the negative aspects of the revised Nagodba. It also attempted to explain why and how it had come about. Among other things, it concluded that it was not the people's fault but the fault of their leaderships, their intelligentsia, who had faltered in the struggle because "materially and morally, they do not stand upon firm footing." Under the intelligentsia's leadership, the National Party had abandoned its programme in the hope, Zastava claimed, of grabbing power, "which opened the doors for various high posts to their followers."¹¹⁵ According to Zastava, both Nagodbas, that of 1868 as well as that of 1873, were a product of the aristocracy, the difference being that "the first was sponsored by the Magyaron and the second by the Nationalist bureaucracy."¹¹⁶ The Serbian opposition interpreted the revision of the Nagodba as a well calculated plan of the Hungarian government to destroy the National Party and "from its remnants" in Croatia to create new followers, since it could no longer rely upon the old ones.¹¹⁷ They believed that with the revision the Hungarian government had succeeded in creating a breach in the National Party's ranks, which would inevitably lead to "the breaking-down, or at the least to the impairment of public morals," and thereby to the ruin of the party, which had condemned itself to a slow death.¹¹⁸

The Serbian National Freethinkers Party held that by accepting the revised Nagodba, Croatia had renounced a common Serbian and Croatian national, political, and liberation action, that it had "abdicated from the South Slav idea," and that in the situation in which it found itself after 1873, it could not offer even moral assistance that would "contribute to a higher aim, to the future of the Serbian and Croatian people in the south."¹¹⁹ Because of this unfavourable attitude to the revised Nagodba, the Serbian National Freethinkers Party, immediately after Mazuranic's appointment as ban and the assumption of power by the Nationalists, proclaimed that it would again be in opposition to the new Nagodba and would endeavour to change it in a constitutional way and replace it with "real state autonomy." Miletic and his followers further proclaimed: "If the government should pledge its prestige, its influence, and its official position against its parliamentary opposition, we shall stand in opposition to it and keep it in check. The tone (which makes the music) will depend on its actions, on the quality of its instruments, on the use or misuse of its official position."¹²⁰

The outcome was exactly what Kállay wanted to achieve with the revision of the Nagodba, which his superiors in Budapest and Vienna, in the first place Count Andrássy, had in mind when they concluded the compromise with the Croats. The two strongest parties of the Serbs and Croats, which until the revision had coordinated their national political programmes and put up powerful opposition to the dualist system and the policy of the Hungarian government, parted ways the moment the Nationalists from Croatia rejected the opposition's programme and, for the sake of getting rid of the Unionist government and coming into power themselves, torpedoed the national and political aims they had heretofore held in common with the Serbian opposition. What transpired was that the National Party in conjunction with the Serbian opposition pursued a joint national political programme, including the liberation and annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, until it won power with the help of the Serbian government. Having succeeded in it, not only did it forsake the joint programme but it embarked on a policy which was directly aimed against their former Serbian allies and against Serbian interests as a whole. This about-face in the National Party's stance toward the Serbs was particularly evident in regard to Bosnia and Hercegovina. The National Party no longer adhered to the principle laid down by Bishop Strossmayer in 1871, who, as its most prominent champion, left it up to Serbia to judge "when the time is ripe for the undertaking and which methods are to be used for the purpose." In contrast to Strossmayer, who in April 1871 wrote: "Not only shall we not place any encumbrances on the Serbian government in the execution of its task, not only shall we not hinder it from annexing Bosnia and Hercegovina, but we shall beg Serbia to take us in as well, if at all possible," the National Party after 1873 wanted Bosnia and Hercegovina to be attached to Croatia. This shift in the National Party's policy once again full vindicated Consul Kállay's forecasts, because Bosnia and Hercegovina was to become a large stumbling block between the Croats and the Serbs, which was skilfully and perfidiously placed in their way by Austria-Hungary. The Monarchy thus prepared to grab Bosnia and Hercegovina with the least amount of hindrances. By giving Croatia the hope of getting Bosnia and Hercegovina, it broke up the Serbian and Croatian unity, thereby removing one of the obstacles on the way to its goal.

The causes of all the misunderstandings and conflicts arising between the Croats and Serbs after the Nagodba's revision in 1873 also lay in the changed political conceptions of the National Party. While it fought together with the Serbs against the Nagodba and the dualist system, it neglected the question of Croatian state rights. When it came to power in 1873, it returned to its old policy from the period between the collapse of absolutism in 1860 and the victory of the dualist idea in 1866/67. After 1873, all those contradictions between the Serbs and Croats which had bedeviled their relations in the mentioned period again came to surface. Invoking Croatian state rights, the National Party demanded that Bosnia be attached to Croatia. A corollary to the idea of state rights was the notion that in the Croatian state territory there was only one "diplomatic" ("political") people - the Croatian people. As a result, after 1873, Serbs in Croatia were not recognized as a separate national entity but were again treated as part of the Croatian "political" people. The consequence of this policy, whose aim was Croatization, was a consistent erasure of the Serbian name and the hindering of Serbs in Croatia in their further national development. Because the very existence of the Serbian nation in Croatia was thereby brought into question, a clash was inevitable.

The Nagodba revision clearly acted as a disintegrating factor in relations between the Croats and Serbs. It brought into conflict two national ideas which were mutually exclusive. As the Croats and Serbs had nothing but harm from their conflict, while Austria-Hungary reaped benefits, the 1873 revision of the Croato-Hungarian Nagodba was a heavy defeat not only for the Croatian but also for Serbian policy, and an important victory for the policy of Vienna and Budapest. With small and insignificant concessions granted to Croatia, Austria-Hungary had succeeded in sowing discord between the Croats and Serbs and in repressing the Yugoslav idea for many years to come. Thus the Monarchy reduced and broke up the South Slav movements, and without much difficulty managed to keep them under control. It was able to pursue its policy without having to consider the aspirations of the Serbs and Croats. Judging by the far-reaching repercussions it had, the Nagodba's revision represents one of the major turning points in the recent history of the Serbs and Croats.

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Copyright © 1997 by Vasilije Krestic
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Copyright © 1998 by Serbian Unity Congress